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Journal of Legal Commentary
CONCLUSION
The issue of professional liability to nonclients will continue to
arise in the judicial setting. As additional exceptions are carved,
the courts will be forced to address the privity requirements as it
relates to attorneys. The majority of states, including New York,
still require privity in order to recover in negligence from an at-
torney while acting in his professional capacity. Those states that
do not require strict privity have articulated various tests to deter-
mine whether or not an attorney owed a duty of care to a non-
client. It is submitted that the strict privity requirment is in jeop-
ardy in New York and courts may expose attorneys to liability for
professional negligence to plaintiffs with whom they are not in
privity.
Melinda R. Katz
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN BAR ADMISSIONS
Each state establishes its own bar admission procedures which
require the applicant to meet certain character and fitness crite-
ria.1 Generally, the qualifications for admission require a prospec-
tive attorney to possess a bachelor's degree, a law degree from an
approved school,2 to pass a written examination,3 and to establish
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (state can require bar applicants to possess certain
qualifications to be eligible for admission).
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. Graduation from an ABA-ap-
proved law school is to "provide uniform and measurable standards by which to assess the
qualifications of applicants." LaBossiere v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 279 So. 2d 288,
289 (Fla. 1973). There is reliance on the ABA due to the fact that state supreme courts are
"unequipped to make such a determination ... because of financial limitations and the
press of judicial business." Id.
California has a "Baby Bar" requirement that students attending law schools not ap-
proved by California's Committee of Bar Examiners must take and pass an exam at the end
of their first year so as to receive credit from the Committee for further study. See Lupert
v. California State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.) (upheld constitutionality of Baby
Bar), cert. denied, and appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 916 (1985).
1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. See Richardson v. McFadden, 540
F.2d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1976) (purpose of bar examination is to distinguish between those
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his good moral character.' The judiciary is charged with regulat-
ing who may practice law. 5 In a majority of states the highest
court is the ultimate arbiter of who shall be admitted to practice.6
Courts are permitted to delegate their authority to a board of bar
examiners or a fitness committee.
Evaluating a person's fitness to practice law is a subjective deter-
mination. 8 Therefore, it is not surprising that bar admission en-
genders much litigation.9 The doctrine of judicial immunity insu-
lates a judge's judicial acts from vexatious lawsuits, thereby
insuring their independence and the proper administration of jus-
"demonstrating minimal competence" and those who do not), modified, 563 F.2d 1130 (4th
Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089,
1101 (5th Cir. 1975) (bar exam tests minimal present competence), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
940 (1976).
' Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. SeeSchware, 353 U.S. at 239 (state
can require qualification of good moral character); In re Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 284,
51 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (1944) (moral character and fitness a condition precedent to bar
admission), affd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947). See generally Rhode, Moral Character
as Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985) (comprehensive survey of history, struc-
ture and objectives of character as criteria for attorneys).
' See, e.g., Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856) ("[W]ell settled ... that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its of-
ficers"): Feldman v. State Board of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1971)
(judicial branch has exclusive jurisdiction to admit and disbar attorneys, though legislature
may pass general rules). See generally Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the
Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 525 (1983) (discussion of how
courts successfully took control over bar). Twelve states give responsibility for admission to
the judiciary through their constitution. See ARK. CONST. art. XXVIII, amend. 28; FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 15; IND CONST. art. VII, § 4; Ky. CONST. § 116; LA. CONST. art V, § 5(B);
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 3; N.D. CONST. art IV, § 87; OHIO
CONsT. art. IV, § 2(B); PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(e); S.C. CONST. art V, § 4; VT. CONST. § 30.
' See Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 655,
662 (1981) ("Typically, state supreme court acts as the general overseer .... "). In New
York, it is the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court which is responsible for determin-
ing whether the applicant possesses moral character and fitness. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(l)(a)
(McKinney 1983).
' See In re Brennan, 230 App. Div. 218, 219, 243 N.Y.S. 705, 706 (1930) (character and
fitness committee appointed by Appellate Division to certify applicants for admission to
bar): Hill, Appellate Review of Moral Character and Fitness Determinations, B. EXAM., Aug.
1982, at 22, 23 (because appellate courts are not equipped to hear and record evidence,
board is usually created to make initial fitness determination). See N.Y. JUt. LAW § 90(1)(c).
' See Rhode, supra note 4, at 529 (inherent subjectivity of moral fitness). Because of the
ambiguity surrounding the good moral character requirement, the Supreme Court held
that any qualifications must have "a rational connection to the applicant's fitness . . . to
practice law." Schware, 353 U.S. at 239. See Comment, The Investigation of Good Moral Char-
acter for Admission to the Virginia Bar - Time for a Change, 19 U. RicH. L. REV. 601, 605 (1985)
("rational relation" test, without guidelines, is of little value).
' See Special Project, supra note 6, at 658.
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tice.'0 Whether the doctrine of judicial immunity applies to bar
admission decisions was the issue in the recent case of Sparks v.
Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Sparks that the ac-
tions taken by the state supreme court and the character and fit-
ness committee in connection with the admission of an applicant
to the state bar were judicial acts for which absolute immunity
attached. 2 Sparks had sued the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Su-
preme Court and the Kentucky Character and Fitness Committee
for damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations
of his procedural and substantive due process rights in the court's
refusal to admit him into the bar.13 The district court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the defendants enjoyed absolute
immunity."' Although the court of appeals affirmed, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and directed it to reconsider in light
0 See generally Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
In Stump, the Court held that a circuit judge was immune from a Section 1983 damages
suit for his approval of a mother's petition for permission to have her "somewhat re-
tarded" fifteen year old daughter sterilized. 435 U.S. at 349. The case reaffirmed the doc-
trine that judicial acts, even if malicious and unconstitutional, are absolutely immune unless
performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57. In Pierson, a municipal police
justice was given immunity from a Section 1983 damage suit for his judicial acts in convict-
ing a group of white and black clergymen for breach of the peace while they were attempt-
ing to use a segregated bus terminal. 386 U.S. at 547. But see, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466
U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief
against a judicial officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503
(1974) (judges not immune from criminal prosecution for civil rights violations).
A major reason for granting judicial immunity has been the need for decisions to be
rendered free of any personal considerations, including personal liability. See Stump, 435
U.S. at 363 (quoting Bradley for the proposition that judicial officers must be "free to act
upon [theirl own convictions without apprehension of personal consequences"). See gener-
ally Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879
(comprehensive history of the development of judicial immunity).
" 859 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1120 (1989).
12 Id. at 428-29.
"s Id. at 429. To assert a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under color of state law or authority to de-
prive the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States. See Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1974).
An associate member of the Kentucky Bar Committee determined, based on an interview
with the applicant, that Sparks lacked the requisite moral and character fitness to practice
law. Sparks, 859 F.2d at 429. The record does not indicate the basis of the decision. Sparks,
818 F.2d 541, 542 (6th Cir. 1987).
14 Sparks, 818 F.2d at 542.
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of the Court's ruling in Forrester v. White. 5 The court of appeals
distinguished Forrester and again affirmed. 6
The Supreme Court in Forrester announced the analytical key
for determining what a judicial act is for purposes of granting ju-
dicial immunity. The analysis focused on the function performed
and not the identity of the actor who performed it.' 7 The Sparks
Court held that there were three reasons suggested in the For-
rester decision which would indicate that the chief justice and the
committee members were performing judicial acts. 8 The first was
the availability of appellate review which Forrester cited as a cen-
tral reason for granting judicial immunity. 9 Second, Forrester
quoted with approval Bradley v. Fisher,"0 in which judicial immu-
nity was given to a court for disbarring an attorney. 21 The infer-
ence was that if disbarment proceedings are judicial acts, then it
follows that the power to determine admissions to the bar are also
judicial acts.22 Finally, the determination of bar membership is in-
" 484 U.S. 219 (1988). In Forrester, an Illinois state court judge who discharged a pro-
bation officer pursuant to a state statute was not shielded by judicial immunity. Id.
'6 Sparks, 859 F.2d 428, 429 (6th Cir. 1988).
'7 Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229. The Court had previously defined a judicial act in Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The Stump Court held that the proper inquiry for
purposes of granting immunity would be (1) whether the judge performed a function nor-
mally performed by a judge and (2) whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity. Id.
Sparks, 859 F.2d at 433.
" Id. See also Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (availa-
bility of appellate review is factor in determining whether act is judicial), vacated in part,
605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979). An applicant who is not recommended for admission by a
committee can appeal the decision to the state supreme court. See Hill, supra note 7, at 23.
If the state supreme court denies admission, the decision is subject to discretionary review
by the United States Supreme Court, if federal issues are raised. See In re Summers, 325
U.S. 561, 568-69 (1944) (freedom of religion); Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F.2d
605, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (due process); Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir.
1976) (equal protection and due process), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
0 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
S Sparks, 859 F.2d at 433. In Bradley v. Fisher, the attorney for an alleged conspirator in
Lincoln's assassination sued the judge who disbarred him after a hung jury verdict. 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 344. In denying relief due to judicial immunity, the Court wrote that even
though the plaintiff's due process rights were violated, this "did not make the act any less a
judicial act." Id. at 356-57.
22 Sparks, 859 F.2d at 433. There has been little dispute that disciplinary and disbarment
proceedings are judicial acts. See, e.g., Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535
(1869) (judge disbarring attorney acts judicially and is thus immune from damage suit); Ex
parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 15 (1856) (disbarment decision is "in its nature a
judicial act"). Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972) (state court's disci-
plinary proceedings are judicial inquiry).
335
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 332, 1989
herently the function of the judiciary.2"
THE ADMINISTRATIVE/JUDICIAL DICHOTOMY OF BAR ADMISSIONS
A. The Immunity of Judges
A positive aspect of the Forrester decision is its recognition that
there is a need to distinguish judicial acts from administrative or
legislative acts.24 While judicial acts enjoy immunity, the adminis-
trative, ministerial and executive aspects of a judge's duties do
not.25 The procedures for admitting an applicant to the bar have
been characterized as part legislative and part adjudicative. 2 Gen-
erally, the adjudicative function involves the individualized deter-
mination of whether the applicant is fit to practice law in that
state, whereas the legislative function is the establishment of rules
which apply to every candidate. 27 A judicial act requires the utili-
zation of discretion and judgment which is closely akin to the ad-
2" Sparks, 859 F.2d at 434. Employment decisions made by judges have been held to be
administrative tasks in which judicial immunity does not attach. Id. See Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (dismissal of probation officer not judicial act): Guercio v. Brody,
814 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissal of confidential secretary is administrative
act), vacated in part, reh'g granted, 823 F.2d 166 (1987) (en banc), vacated, 840 F.2d 358, re-
reported in full, 859 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1988); McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155
(7th Cir.) (firing of court reporter is administrative act), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986).
However, the admission of attorneys is inherently a judicial function. See Sparks, 859
F.2d at 434: cf. Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (bar committee
members absolutely immune while exercising inherent judicial power).
2 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229. The definition of a judicial act announced in Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978), garnered much criticism from commentators. See
Note, What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity? 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
1503, 1508 n.41 (1985) (Stump definition inherently vague). See also supra note 17.
25 See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) (when
promulgating code of rules for attorneys, judges have legislative immunity, not judicial
immunity). See also J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, TORTS § 1108 (14th ed. 1975):
Officers of courts of justice act either judicially or ministerially. A judicial act is one
which involves the exercise of a discretion, in which something has to be heard and
decided. A ministerial act is one which the law points out as necessary to be done
under the circumstances, without leaving any choice of alternative courses.
Id. quoted in Block, supra note 10, at 887): supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Judges can obtain professional liability insurance if sued for their administrative deci-
sions or if found liable under Section 1983 for plaintiff's attorneys' fees. See And Now, Mal-
practice Insurance For Judges, 123 N.J.L.J., June 8, 1989, at 1, index page 1401.
26 See Special Project, supra note 6, at 662.
2I Id. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731 (promulgating a code of rules for attorneys is
"not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking"). See generally Note, Procedural Due
Process and Character Hearings for Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. REV. 500, 515 n.76 (1963)
(difference between adjudication and rule making).
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judication of controversies.28 The Supreme Court in In re Sum-
mers 9 held that "[a] claim of a present right to admission to the
bar of a state and a denial of that right is a controversy" within
the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.30 However, when
the validity of a rule is not challenged but a petition is made to
waive one of its bar admission rules, some courts have found the
ensuing state court action is ministerial, not judicial and that the
decision rendered is one by a court acting in its administrative ca-
pacity.31 Nevertheless, the majority of the pre-Forrester decisions
have concluded that the consideration of an application for admis-
sion to the bar is judicial rather than administrative in nature.3"
B. The Extension of Immunity to Quasi-Judicial Officials
The absolute immunity given to the members of the character
and fitness committee in Sparks is not the first instance where a
court has given absolute immunity to officials acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity. The Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou34 an-
8 See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731 (judicial functions arise out of adjudication of
controversies); Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp. 1330, 1335-36 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (judicial
act requires discretion and normal elements of judicial proceeding); cf. Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 510-11 (1978) (discretionary functions of prosecutor deserve absolute immu-
nity because of same policy reasons supporting judicial immunity).
9' 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
80 Id. at 568.
31 See Ktsanes v. Underwood, 552 F.2d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 1977) (denial of bar appli-
cant's waiver petition administrative), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978): Brooks v. Laws,
208 F.2d 18, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (evaluation of application for admission is not decision
or judgment). But see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476-82 (1983) (court's denial of applicant's waiver petition was judicial inquiry in which
court adjudicated claims of present right to admission to bar); Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555
F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (D. Colo. 1983) ("Even in exercising its judgment on an individual
petition, a court performs a judicial act.")
31 See, e.g., Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada, 490 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (D. Nev. 1980)
("[Alcts of supreme court justices in deciding matters pertaining to admission to the bar
are judicial acts."); Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 n.17 (E.D.
La.) (judicial immunity applies to denial of petitioner's admission to bar), affd, 537 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1976); cf Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of Nevada, 623 F.2d
605, 610 n.10 (9th Cir. 1980) (in bar admission petition "soundness of the district court's
interpretation that absence of judicial trappings negates the existence of a judicial act is
questionable.")
" See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (prosecutor absolutely immune for
actions taken in initiating and prosecuting case). As with judges, prosecutor's absolute im-
munity does not extend to those responsibilities that are administrative or investigative. See
Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 507 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913
(1981). Court clerks have been given absolute immunity for their discretionary duties. See
337
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nounced three considerations which a court must weigh in deter-
mining whether to extend immunity: (1) the "functional compara-
bility" of the official's judgments to those of a judge;"6 (2) whether
the nature of the proceeding is such that there is a realistic pros-
pect of harassment by disappointed litigants; 6 and (3) the availa-
bility of safeguards adequate to reduce the need for private dam-
age actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. 7
Bar associations involved in investigating and presenting cases
for attorney disciplinary or disbarment proceedings have been
granted absolute immunity from damages.38 Other courts before
Sparks have similarly extended absolute immunity to bar commit-
tees involved with the admission of attorneys. 9 The common
Note, supra note 24, at 1513 n.73 for cases cited therein. Court clerks are given absolute
immunity for actions taken under command of court decrees or under instructions of a
judge. See Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (issuance of arrest warrant
by clerk at direction of judge is a judicial act); Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856
(8th Cir. 1988) (clerk absolutely immune for issuance of arrest warrant at direction of
judge).
The doctrine of absolute legislative immunity protects individuals while acting within the
bounds of their legislative duties. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951)
(state legislators absolutely immune from suits for damages under § 1983): Reed v. Village
of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952 (7th Cir. 1983) (legislative immunity applies to local
legislators): Herbst v. Daukas, 701 F. Supp. 964, 970 (D. Conn. 1988) (town council mem-
bers have legislative immunity in their individual capacities for eliminating one lieutenant
in police department).
3 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
I ld. at 512.
36 Id.
11 Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Bar candidates have due process rights.
See Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 106 (1963) (cannot reject
applicant without first giving notice and hearing either before committee or court having
authority over bar admissions): Mattox v. Disciplinary Panel of U.S. Dist. Court, 758 F.2d
1362, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1985) (due process requirements of notice and hearing should
apply equally to federal and state court admission decisions). The burden of proof is on the
individual to prove his or her fitness. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961). In a disciplinary proceeding the state has the burden of proving the
lawyer's unfitness. See, e.g., In re Simpson, 47 II. 2d 562, 566, 268 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1971).
38 See Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kissell v. Breskow,
579 F.2d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1978); Clark v. State of Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th
Cir. 1966).
"' See Rosenfeld v. Clark, 586 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Vt. .1984) (board of bar examiners im-
mune from damages for failure to review applicant's examination within statutorily pre-
scribed time period), affd, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985): Louis v. Supreme Court of Ne-
vada, 490 F. Supp. 1174, 1180-81 (D. Nev. 1980) (Board of Bar Examiners and state bar
immune from suit as they are under direct control and supervision of state supreme court);
Greene v. Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 506, 204 Cal. Rptr. 770, 781 (1984) (state bar and
committee members have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for acts while performing plain-
tiff's pre-admission investigation). Bar examiners have been found exempt from antitrust
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thread running through the cases is the belief that as arms of the
court, these committee actions are actually actions of the state
court. 40 Therefore, if the official is acting in a quasi-judicial capac-
ity he should be granted absolute immunity; if his actions are min-
isterial and executive, he should not.4
CONCLUSION
The most immediate effect of Forrester v. White is that courts
reviewing whether an act is judicial, administrative, or legislative
will focus more on the form and substance of the proceedings."2
The decision by the Sixth Circuit in Sparks to immunize judges
and bar committee members from damage suits for their bar ad-
mission decisions should not adversely affect the rights of appli-
cants. The possibility that a court or its committee may arbitrarily
determine an applicant is unfit to practice will not leave the appli-
cant without recourse. Despite the defense of judicial immunity
for admission decisions, applicants clearly have due process rights
and an appellate remedy. Sparks should not be interpreted as ei-
ther altering or diminishing those rights.
Katherine Ann Wopat
scrutiny in the grading of bar examinations. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). But
see Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 746 n.2 (4th Cir. 1976) ("lilt is crystal clear
that in giving and grading examinations and certifying passing scores the Board of Bar
Examiners neither renders judicial decisions nor exercises judicial functions."), modified,
563 F.2d 1130 (1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
"0 See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 573 (actions of committee were in reality those of state su-
preme court); Simons, 643 F.2d at 781 (committee members "must almost by definition
make decisions comparable to those of a judge.").
" Rosenfeld, 586 F. Supp. at 1339. For example, bar examiners judicial duties would
include determining which applicants are qualified for admission and ministerial duties
would include providing an applicant with review of his/her examination results. Id.
" See Ohse v. Hughes, 863 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1988). On remand from the Supreme
Court after its decision in Forrester, the Seventh Circuit indicated that absolute immunity
may attach to the actions of a panel of judges in terminating a probation officer if the
procedures used at the termination hearing were those normally employed in an adjudica-
tion proceeding, i.e., right to counsel, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, discovery,
verbatim transcript and a discernible burden of proof. Id. at 24.
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